By Haroon Ahmed
The early discussion within the book is centered around Ibn Taymiyya’s apparent acceptance of his female teacher delivering a Friday sermon, through which Shaikh seeks to prove that the female imamate is a historically accepted act. She states, “who would have thought that one of the most renowned mujtahids of the premodern Muslim world, Taqi al-din ibn Taymiyya, an individual whom many present-day chauvinists claim as their religious luminary, would have been subdued into accepting a woman’s authority by a dream” (p 2). This statement is illogical because, for one, those in opposition to the female imamate are not simply just those that follow ibn Taymiyya. In reality, there are many that both oppose many of ibn Taymiyya’s views, as well as the female imamate; however, this is not acknowledged nor discussed by Shaikh. Further, she herself recounts this incident as being that of a very old woman giving a sermon on Friday; there is no mention of if the woman actually led the prayer or ever held a so-called imamate position, yet Shaikh reaches this conclusion by herself. Also, what she simplifies here as “accepting a woman’s authority by a dream”, actually refers to (via Shaikh’s own recounting of the story) the Prophet saws comforting Ibn Taymiyya in a dream after he was so distraught from the sermon. There is no mention in the story of a woman’s authority being accepted in any manner; what being is retold is simply that ibn Taymiyya was comforted by a dream. To extend this to serve as proof that Ibn Taymiyya accepted a woman’s imamate is illogical and a hyperbole fallacy.
A major logical fallacy that is prevalent throughout the book is Dicto Simpliciter, or “Hasty Generalization”. Although her main focus in the book is of the writings and beliefs of Ibn ‘Arabi, throughout the first chapter she over-generalizes the entire previous generations of Sufis. They are described as having contributed to this patriarchal domination of both Islam and history in general. For example, when speaking of Sufi biographical literature, she states that “such female images within the canonical traditions fortified an entrenched discourse of female shortcomings vis-a-vis men within the broader religious imagination. The notion of ‘female deficiency’ was embedded in the cultural backdrop inherited by all the Sufi premodern, including Ibn ‘Arabi” (p 46). Here she has generalized all of the Sufi premodern, when in reality she is focusing solely on Ibn ‘Arabi. She does not cite in entirety all of the premodern Sufi scholars she is including in this, nor does she examine their views in detail like she does for Ibn ‘Arabi. Rather, by her own admission throughout the chapter, there were several instances in history where women reached a high status in various Sufi orders and were not seen as deficient at all. So, to state that all of the Sufi premodern were inherently gendered against women is a contradiction of her very own research. Further, her generalizations can be seen throughout the book in instances where she takes a majority to be absolute and does not account for the minority which still does exist, in order to bolster her argument. For example, when speaking of premodern Islamic texts, she states “most often, the subject, the audience, and the authors of these texts are male. One thus encounters only the voice and life-worlds of men on all issues, even when women’s realities are recorded” (p 24). It is interesting here how “most often” then becomes “all” in the next sentence. She does not take into account that, although a minority, there were still various female scholars and readers. It is an illogical conclusion to argue that all voices were men when she first states that most were. Such contradicting statements weaken her overall argument throughout the book.
Furthermore, the book contains the fallacy of Argumentum Ad Verecundiam, or “Appeal to Authority”, wherein Shaikh quotes opinions of those that are not qualified, nor have the authority, to speak on such matters. For example, when speaking of a creation theory of Adam and Eve, she states “contemporary feminist scholars have celebrated some of the gender-egalitarian elements of the Qur’anic creation story that assert men and women as created from a single soul, noting that Muslim scripture does not present Eve as secondary to Adam in creation” (p 142). While this might be an interesting theory, “contemporary feminist scholars” are not an authoritative nor accepted voice on the interpretation of the Qur’an. One can further expect that such a feminist scholar, ie, one who is engaged in the study of gender, would try to find such “gender-egalitarian elements” to align with their own views. Not only does this present an ideal situation for a biased interpretation of the Qur’an, but they are simply unqualified and untrained to speak on such matters. She provides a lengthy argument about the issue of Eve’s creation, including that “the Qur’anic narrative is open to a number of interpretations, including the view that God originally created a single, engendered soul that subsequently split into two, the spirited halves then becoming embodied as gendered human beings, male and female” (p 143). Again, she has not provided any statement made by an authority in the realm of Qur’anic interpretation, either male or female, who can attest to what she is arguing. Thus, this argument is extremely weak because those who are arguing for it – feminist scholars – are not experts in the field, but rather are simply those whose own opinions would be validated by such a conclusion.
By stating that the Qur’an is open to numerous interpretations in this regard, she is actually validating the opposing view as well. Using her own logic that many interpretations are valid, an opposite interpretation (such as that Eve was created from Adam and therefore women are dependent on men) would be equally as valid of an interpretation as her own. She does not provide any supporting evidence or on why her interpretation is more valid, but simply that many interpretations could be valid. It thus does not help her argument at all and actually weakens it as it puts her argument on the same level logically as the opposing argument.
Lastly, Shaikh often appeals to the intended audience of her book – feminist readers – through powerful emotion rather than logic, which is a logical fallacy known as Argumentum ad Misericordiam or “Appeal to Pity”. For example, when discussing Amina Wadud leading Friday prayers in New York City in 2005, Shaikh describes Wadud’s sermon as “her words were like a glorious, warm summer rain, drenching us in mercy and radiating all kinds of existential possibilities. This was a spiritually ripe sermon, inspired and inspiring, beautiful and beautifying, luminous and illuminating” (p 4). She does not give any details of substance on what was said in this sermon, nor even what the topic was, but rather she relies on strong emotional imagery to engender support for her view that a female imamate is a positive and spiritually uplifting experience. Furthermore, she later describes the female role in mosques as; “woman, whose essence is characterized by a chaos-creating sexuality, needs to be removed, rendered invisible, dispatched into liminal spaces, and deprived of voice. Thus, with such effort toward and effect on women, the spiritual sanctity of the mosque (for men) is retained – a dubious notion of moral agency, indeed.” (p 8). Again, she does not present an argument here, but rather is appealing to pity through the powerful emotional expression of women being put down and dominated by men. Rather than present and combat the various arguments that her opposition might have about women in mosques, Shaikh weakens her own argument by oversimplifying it as being a victimization of women. Surely the opposing side does not argue that they literally want to “render women invisible and deprive them of voice”; perhaps this is what Shaikh feels from them, but it does not help her logically prove a point. In this case, she would be better off defending her view through rationale rather than emotion.
In conclusion, while Sa’diyya Shaikh has set out to argue for an Islamic feminism, her arguments lack the necessary logic and framework to make them substantial. Although she argues that history is male-dominated and biased, her arguments come off as very biased themselves, with feminist scholars arguing feminist interpretation for a feminist audience. To make her conclusions stronger, she would need to include supporting evidence from those outside of her own field of feminist studies, as well as work on the several logical fallacies prevalent throughout her work.
